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We investigate the impact of civil war on high skilled emigration 
rates to the OECD over the period 1985-2000. Controlling for 
economic and institutional characteristics of source countries, we 
find that civil war increases high skilled emigration by about 5 
percent on the average. However, the nature of conflict matters: 
While brain drain from countries with ethnic conflict is about 6-8 
percent greater on average than it is from countries without 
conflict, brain drain from countries with nonethnic conflict is less, 
and statistically insignificant. Duration also matters: Each 
additional year of ethnic conflict worsens the brain drain by 
between 0.4 and 1 percent, whereas the effect of an additional year 
of nonethnic conflict is small and insignificant.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The last decade and a half has seen the emergence of a vast literature on the causes and 
consequences of brain drain or the migration of tertiary skilled labor (Commander et al., 2004; 
Docquier et al., 2008). Yet the role of conflict as a determinant of skilled migration remains 
relatively unexplored. This paper investigates the impact of internal conflict or civil war in the 
countries of origin on the magnitude of brain drain to the OECD at five-year intervals over the 
period 1985-2000. Controlling for economic and institutional characteristics of source countries, 
we find that civil war increases high skilled emigration on the average. Further, the consequences 
of civil war on the migration of tertiary skilled labor depend critically on the type of conflict 
being experienced in the country of origin: While ethnic civil war increases the fraction of 
tertiary skilled emigrants, nonethnic civil war has no significant impact on the extent of brain 
drain. In exploring reasons behind the differential impact on selection, we find that it is primarily 
due to the fact that the ethnic civil wars tend to last longer on the average than nonethnic wars. 
Interestingly, even though nonethnic wars exhibit a greater intensity of violence in our sample, 
this does not translate into a significant impact of nonethnic conflict on brain drain.  
In providing a more nuanced analysis of the role of internal conflict on skilled migration, our 
study contributes to the literature that investigates the causes and consequences of brain drain. In 
addition, given the importance of skilled diasporas in bringing about the resolution of conflict as 
also helping the reconstruction of an economy after years of civil war, it helps understand how 
migration policy in developed nations can serve the cause of peace. Lastly, it contributes to the 
emerging literature on conflict that calls for the recognition of ethnic conflict as a separate 
conceptual category because it emerges from different motivations and has different 
consequences than other forms of political violence.   2
 
2. Conceptual Preliminaries  
An emerging interdisciplinary literature urges the recognition of ethnic and nonethnic 
conflict as distinct phenomena.
1 There is considerable evidence that ethnic civil wars tend to be 
of greater duration (Kirschner, 2009); exhibit a greater probability of recurrence (Kreutz, 2010); 
lead to a greater intensity of violence; and bear a greater risk of escalation (Eck, 2009) than civil 
wars erupting along schisms other than ethnicity. In addition, it has been argued that ethnic and 
nonethnic conflict may arise due to different causes (Sambanis, 2001; Reynal-Querol, 2002). As 
such, it is worth investigating if the two types of civil war differ in their consequences on 
economic outcomes; in our case, the migration of highly skilled labor. Specifically, we explore 
the hypothesis that ethnic civil wars may lead to greater migration of highly skilled labor, on the 
average, than nonethnic civil wars.  
The underlying rationale is simple: Internal conflict reduces expected returns to educational 
investment and hence provides an incentive to migrate for individuals who have already 
undertaken the investment in education. If ethnic conflict lasts longer than nonethnic conflict on 
the average, then controlling for the intensity of violence, it is likely to reduce the expected 
returns to education more permanently than nonethnic conflict. Hence, a society experiencing 
ethnic civil war is likely to suffer a greater magnitude of brain drain on the average than one with 
nonethnic civil war.  
Any empirical inquiry into the causes and consequences of civil war faces the problem that 
the literature is hardly unanimous on the operational definition of the phenomenon. Most studies 
are, however, based on one of two identification criteria extant in the literature, namely that of 
                                                 
1 See the references in Eck (2009). For an argument against the separation of ethnic and nonethnic conflict, see King 
(2001).    3
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Gleditsch et al., 2002) and that of the Political 
Instability Task Force (PITF). To establish the robustness of our results, we adopt both of these 
definitions. As per the identification criteria proposed by UCDP, a civil war is a contested 
incompatibility between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups 
with or without external intervention that concerns either government or territory or both and 
where the use of armed force results in at least 25 battle related deaths per year.
2 This yields 51 
country-years of civil war over our sample period 1985-2000.
3 For an episode of political 
violence to be counted as a civil war by PITF, however, it must occur between the government of 
a sovereign state and either political or ethnic challengers internal to the state. Further, ‘each 
party must mobilize 1000 or more people …. and there must be at least 1000 direct conflict-
related deaths over the full course of the armed conflict and at least one year when the annual 
conflict-related death toll exceeds 100 fatalities.’
4 This yields 48 country-years of civil war over 
the period of interest. 
An even greater concern relates to the definition of an ethnic civil war. The PITF State 
Failure Problem Set explicitly distinguishes between ethnic and nonethnic or revolutionary wars, 
where the former comprise ‘episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, 
ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers 
seek major changes in their status.’ Revolutionary wars, on the other hand, occur ‘between 
governments and politically organized groups (political challengers)… that seek to overthrow 
the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region.’ Based on the 
                                                 
2 This includes the categories internal armed conflict and internationalized internal armed conflict in the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. For more information, refer to the codebook available at the UCDP webpage:  
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm 
3 Recall that our sample is defined at five year intervals, not annually.  
4 This includes the categories revolutionary war and ethnic war in the PITF State Failure Problem Set. For more 
information, consult the codebook at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm   4
PITF classification, we have 37 country- years of ethnic war and 11 country-years of nonethnic 
war over our sample period.  
The PITF definition of ethnic civil war relies explicitly of the identification of ethnic 
affiliations of participants. However, given the problem of changing group boundaries over time, 
identifying an ethnic group may be problematic (Fearon, 2003). As an alternative, Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) focus on the more easily observed process of mobilization: Thus, an ethnic war is 
any civil war where contestants mobilize either partially or entirely along the lines of ethnicity. 
Following Eck (2009), we apply the criterion of Fearon and Laitin (2009) to disaggregate the 
UCDP dataset which otherwise does not distinguish between civil wars by type. This gives us 40 
country- years of ethnic war and 11 country-years of nonethnic war over our sample period. 
3. Empirical Model and Data 
 
To measure the impact of civil war on the emigration of high skilled labor, we estimate the 
following equation:  
      (1) high skillit =  i e Z X + + γ β . 
The dependent variable high-skillit denotes the fraction of highly skilled or tertiary educated 
immigrants from country i in year t. Data on this variable come from Defoort (2006), who 
provides information on the stocks of primary, secondary, and tertiary educated foreign born 
populations in the OECD from 194 source countries. While these data are available at five-year 
intervals over 1975-2000, limitations in the availability of explanatory variables restrict our 
sample to an unbalanced panel covering the period 1985-2000. 
The matrix of controls X includes constant terms that capture both region and year specific 
fixed effects and a set of source country characteristics commonly used in the brain drain 
literature, such as GDP per capita and its square, population, and the CPI inflation rate from the   5
World Development Indicators (WDI); and the total foreign born population in the OECD from a 
given source country in a given year from Defoort (2006). 
Since the impact of conflict on migrant selection may be confounded by the influence of poor 
institutions, we also control for institutional quality in the source countries. To capture the 
multidimensionality of political institutions while still avoiding the problem of multicollinearity, 
we perform an exploratory factor analysis on 13 separate measures of institutional quality. These 
include indices of corruption, bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability, government 
stability, and investment profile taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); 
legislative and executive indices of electoral competition, the political fractionalization index, 
the political polarization index, the index of electoral fraud, and the number of checks and 
balances that exist within government taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI); 
and the democracy-autocracy index and regime durability taken from the Polity IV Project.
5 As 
reported in Table 2, three distinct factors emerge from this analysis: Democracy, which is 
primarily composed of the legislative and electoral indices of electoral competition, the 
democracy-autocracy index, the number of checks and balances in the government, the index of 
democratic accountability, and the indices of political fractionalization and polarization; 
transparency of government operations, which includes the indices of corruption and 
bureaucratic quality, regime durability, and the absence of electoral fraud); and credibility of the 
government, which is primarily composed of the investment profile index and the index of 
government stability. These three factors are included as controls in our regression.  
Finally, the matrix Z contains variables that describe civil wars which may be taking place in 
a given source country in a given year. Depending on the particular aspect of internal conflict we 
                                                 
5 See Bang and Mitra (2010) for a comprehensive description of the methodology and a discussion of alternative 
approaches to addressing the multidimensionality of institutional structure.    6
wish to explore, this matrix may include a simple dummy for the presence of civil war in 
general; separate dummy variables for the presence of ethnic and nonethnic civil war; duration of 
the conflict measured in years; and the intensity of violence measured both by an index and the 
number of battle related deaths in a given country in that year. As mentioned in Section 2, given 
the lack of consensus regarding the definition of civil war, and even more critically, the caveats 
associated with identifying a civil war as ethnic; the conflict variables are taken from two 
alternative datasets, developed by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) and the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) respectively. Since both datasets as also the underlying 
conceptual issues have been introduced in the previous section, we shall conclude the description 
of our data at this point, referring the reader to Table 1 for summary statistics of the variables.  
One problem that may arise in estimating equation (1) using the classical regression model is 
the fact that GDP per capita may be endogenous, and may, in fact, depend on some of other 
factors that are of interest in explaining the brain drain, notably the institutional variables (Knack 
and Keefer, 1995; Alesina et al., 1996). To address this, we estimate (1) using a generalized 
method of moments (GMM) procedure, with per capita energy consumption from the WDI as an 
excluded instrument for per capita GDP. 
 
 
4. Results and Robustness 
As a first look at the data, we consider the effect of the ordinary presence of civil war in a 
given country in a given year on the fraction of tertiary educated emigrants. Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 3 report our initial results with the PITF and UCDP data, respectively. The presence of 
civil war is seen to increase the fraction of tertiary educated emigrants by about 5% when we use   7
the PITF data and by about 7% when we use the UCDP data, and the impact for each is 
significant at the 0.05 level. As noted previously, however, our initial investigation may not 
reveal the full impact of certain types of civil war because the consequences of internal conflict 
could depend critically on the nature of conflict in question. Indeed, the results presented below 
confirm our hypothesis that ethnic conflict has far more dire consequences on the migration of 
highly skilled labor. 
As a second step in our analysis, therefore, we differentiate civil war by type. Including 
separate dummy variables for the two types of civil war based on the PITF criterion for ethnic 
civil war (Sambanis, 2001; Reynal-Querol, 2002), we find that the presence of ethnic conflict 
increases the fraction of tertiary educated emigrants by about 6% and the effect is significant at 
the 0.10 level. Nonethnic conflict also increases the fraction of tertiary educated emigrants, but 
by just about 3% and its impact is statistically insignificant. The results of this exercise are 
reported in Column 3 of Table 3. We subsequently replicate our results using the identification 
criterion proposed by Fearon and Laitin (2003), whereby an ethnic civil war is one where actors 
mobilize along the lines of ethnicity. Following Eck (2009), we first achieve a separation of the 
UCDP data into episodes of ethnic and nonethnic civil war and then include separate dummy 
variables based on the disaggregated UCDP data.  As seen from Column 4 of Table 3, the 
presence of ethnic conflict in a country increases the fraction of tertiary educated emigrants to 
the OECD by about 8% and the effect is significant at the 0.05 level. By contrast, the presence of 
nonethnic conflict increases the fraction of tertiary educated emigrants by about 4% and the 
effect is statistically insignificant.  
As mentioned in Section 2, ethnic civil wars exhibit a different structure of violence than 
nonethnic civil wars in that they tend to last longer; and controlling for duration, may exhibit a 
greater intensity of violence, even though this last is not seen in our sample. Given the presence   8
of civil war, the average ethnic war in our sample period 1985-2000 lasts about 19 years based 
on the Fearon and Laitin (2003) criterion and 10 years based on the PITF criterion. By contrast, 
the average nonethnic war lasts about 17 years based on the Fearon and Laitin (2003) criterion 
and about 8 years using the PITF criterion.
6 With respect to intensity, however, the average 
ethnic war in our sample causes about 2,600 battle-related fatalities per year, whereas the 
average nonethnic war causes about 4,720 fatalities, based on version 3.0 of the PRIO Battle 
Deaths Dataset (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005) that covers cases of conflict included in the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. It is, therefore, natural to ask how the aspects of duration 
and intensity account for the difference in the impact of ethnic and nonethnic conflict on 
selection. To address this, we first consider the impacts of duration and intensity in isolation and 
then take up both aspects simultaneously in the same model.  
The next step in our analysis is, therefore, to introduce separate measures of duration for 
ethnic and nonethnic civil war as captured by the number of years since the onset of the current 
conflict. The coefficients on these variables are interpreted as the marginal effects of an 
additional year of ethnic or nonethnic conflict on the fraction of tertiary educated emigrants, 
given that the country is already experiencing the relevant type of civil war. Columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 3 report the results of this exercise with the PITF and UCDP data, respectively: Based on 
the former, an additional year of ethnic conflict is seen to increase the fraction of tertiary 
educated emigrants by almost 1% and the impact is significant at the 0.05 level. An additional 
year of nonethnic conflict, by contrast, is seen to have a modest negative effect, even though the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant. With the UCDP data, an additional year of ethnic conflict 
is seen to increase the fraction of tertiary educated emigrants by about 0.4% and the result is 
                                                 
6 This conditional mean can be calculated by dividing the mean duration of ethnic (nonethnic) conflict for the entire 
sample by the proportion of countries experiencing ethnic (nonethnic) conflict.    9
significant at the 0.10 level, while an additional year of nonethnic conflict now has a positive 
though smaller and insignificant impact. Interestingly, the coefficient on the presence of ethnic 
conflict turns negative for the PITF dataset when we introduce duration into the model, although 
the negative impact is small, and statistically insignificant. For the UCDP dataset, the effect of 
the onset of ethnic war remains positive, but here too the effect is small and insignificant. To 
sum up, therefore, the duration of ethnic conflict has a significant positive impact on the 
migration of high skilled labor but the duration of nonethnic conflict plays little or no role. 
We now take up the question of intensity in isolation to the duration of civil war. The PITF 
dataset provides three indices of intensity based on the annual number of battle related fatalities; 
the number of rebel combatants; and the part of the country affected by violence, respectively.
7 
Since the UCDP dataset also reports intensity levels based on fatalities, the results presented in 
Column 7 of Table 3 are based on the first index, even though the results are robust to the use of 
the other two indices of intensity.
8 As before, the presence of nonethnic conflict has a significant 
positive impact and an additional battle death from nonethnic conflict has a significant negative 
impact on brain drain at the 0.05 level. In this case, however, neither an additional battle death 
from ethnic conflict nor its ordinary presence has a significant impact on selection. To sum up, 
the intensity of nonethnic conflict has a significant negative impact on the migration of high 
skilled labor but the intensity of ethnic conflict plays little or no role.  
The UCDP dataset measures the intensity of ethnic and nonethnic civil war, using the annual 
number of battle related deaths from version 3.0 of the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset (Lacina and 
Gleditsch, 2005). The coefficients on these variables are interpreted as the marginal effects of an 
                                                 
7 The fatality index (MAGFIGHT) used in this paper takes the value 0 for less than 100 fatalities; 1 for 100-1000 
fatalities; 2 for 1000-5000 fatalities; 3 for 5000-10,000 fatalities; and 4 if the number of battle related deaths exceed 
10,000. The index is assigned a value 9 in the absence of information on casualty figures. See page 8 of the PITF 
Problem Set Codebook for this and the other indices MAGFIGHT and MAGAREA. 
8 The calculations are available on request.   10
additional death from the relevant type of conflict on the fraction of tertiary educated emigrants. 
As seen from Column 8 of Table 3, the presence of both ethnic and nonethnic conflict has a 
significant positive impact on selection at the 0.05 level. However, while the impact of an 
additional battle death is weak and insignificant for ethnic conflict, an additional battle death 
from nonethnic conflict has a significant negative impact on selection at the 0.10 level.  
This begs the question as to why do we see a significant negative impact of intensity on brain 
drain for nonethnic conflict when the intensity of ethnic conflict has a weakly positive impact. A 
reason for this could be that ethnic and nonethnic conflict give rise to different expectations on 
the part of educated elites, who play a vital role in mobilizing the population for conflict 
(Horowitz, 2000). It has been argued that nonethnic conflict arises due to economic grievances, 
either over the lack of economic opportunities or over the division of social surplus (Sambanis, 
2001). Given that civil war is generally observed in societies with weak governments, an 
increase in the intensity of revolutionary conflict may signify an escalation involving greater 
mobilization on the part of the rebel. This will increase the probability of success for elites 
responsible for mobilization and consequently, give them less incentive to migrate. Ethnic 
conflict, on the other hand, often takes the form of deliberate coercion of ethnic minorities and it 
is often the case that educated elites suffer disproportionately more (Docquier and Rapoport, 
2003). Hence, an increase in duration or intensity of ethnic violence may increase the incentive 
to migrate for the highly skilled. However, the effect is weak, given that it also the case that 
ethnic elites may willfully manipulate the rank and file into conflict to pursue their own 
instrumental needs.  
As a final exercise, we include both the duration and the intensity dimension in a single 
model, presented in Columns 9 and 10 for the PITF and UCDP data respectively. With the PITF 
data, we find that an additional year of ethnic conflict increases the fraction of tertiary educated   11
emigrants by about 0.1% and the result is significant at the 0.05 level, while an additional year of 
nonethnic conflict has a statistically insignificant impact. While an additional battle death from 
ethnic conflict has an insignificant positive impact on selection, an additional battle death from 
nonethnic conflict has a negative impact at the 0.10 level. Using the UCDP data again gives us a 
positively significant impact of an additional year of ethnic conflict at the 0.10 level; an 
insignificant negative impact of an additional year of nonethnic conflict; an insignificant impact 
of an additional battle death from ethnic civil war; and a significant negative impact of an 
additional battle death from nonethnic war at the 0.05 level. The mere presence of ethnic conflict 
is now seen to have a negative impact at the 0.10 level of significance, but the marginal 
significance of this effect as also its lack of robustness prevents it from being too much of a 
departure from what we observed before. 
 In summation, therefore, it appears that the duration of ethnic conflict has a much greater 
impact on selection than its intensity. In fact, it seems that the significant difference between the 
impact of ethnic and nonethnic conflict on the magnitude of brain drain is, to a great extent, 
driven by the fact that the ethnic civil wars last longer on the average than nonethnic ones, even 
though the latter may be associated with greater levels of violence.  
It should also be mentioned that the signs and significances of the control variables remain 
robust to changes in the source of conflict data and specifications of the empirical model: 
Institutional quality as captured by the extent of democracy remains negatively significant, 
supporting the hypothesis that lower institutional quality increases the incentives for the highly 
skilled to migrate (Bang and Mitra, 2010). Average educational attainment in the source country 
remains positively significant on the whole, again in line with the existing literature. Lastly, the 
stock of foreign born population in the OECD from a particular country remains negatively 
significant, confirming recent evidence that diasporas may have a negative impact on selection   12
(Docquier et al., 2010). Interestingly, neither GDP nor its square shows up as significant in any 
of the specifications.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigated the impact of civil war on the magnitude of brain drain from a 
country. Specifically, we explored the hypothesis that the root of conflict is important and ethnic 
conflict may have far more serious consequences on the migration of skilled labor than nonethnic 
conflict. Our analysis confirmed that this is indeed the case: While ethnic conflict was seen to 
have a significant positive impact on selection, there was weak evidence that nonethnic conflict 
may, in fact, have a negative impact. Further, the duration of ethnic conflict proved to be 
important, each additional year of this type of civil war increasing the fraction of highly skilled 
emigrants by 0.7% at a minimum. However, the intensity of ethnic conflict turned out to have no 
appreciable impact on the migration of highly skilled labor. The results proved robust both to 
alternative definitions of civil war and to alternative conceptions of ethnic conflict. 
Our study helps to shed light on the relatively unexplored phenomenon of migration from 
societies in conflict. In emphasizing the caveats to considering civil war as a unified 
phenomenon, it provides a more nuanced analysis of the role of conflict as a determinant of 
skilled migration; and at least partially, helps to explain why studies based on the conception of 
civil war as a unified category may have failed to obtain a robust impact of internal conflict on 
the magnitude of brain drain (Beine et al., 2008). Lastly, our study brings up an interesting 
policy question: Given the significant difference in the impact of ethnic and nonethnic conflict 
on the structure of migration, should migration policy in host countries be sensitive to the nature 
of conflict raging in the countries of origin? The ethical dilemma aside, if skilled migration has a 
beneficial impact on the host country, it may be in the best interest of the latter to pursue a less   13
restrictive migration policy towards a country plagued by ethnic conflict than one experiencing 
nonethnic civil war. Further, given the role of skilled diasporas in directing foreign direct 
investment to the countries of origin; facilitating transfers of technology; and ushering in needed 
institutional reform; a more favorable migration policy towards countries experiencing ethnic 
war may significantly help post conflict recovery, especially since the devastation from ethnic 
conflict is considerably greater than other forms of civil war. These and other questions comprise 
important areas of inquiry for further research. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics                    
Variable Source  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
High-Skill Emigration  Defoort  1,160 0.396 0.139  0.062  0.739
Real GDP per capita ($1,000)  WDI  936 5.355 7.938  0.056  46.606
Ethnic Conflict  PITF  1,160 0.095 0.293  0  1
Ethnic Conflict Duration  PITF  1,160 0.966 3.906  0  40
Nonethnic Conflict  PITF  1,160 0.034 0.183  0  1
Nonethnic Conflict Duration  PITF  1,160 0.286 1.954  0  30
Ethnic Conflict  UCDP  1,160 0.104 0.306  0  1
Ethnic Conflict Duration  UCDP  1,160 1.991 7.341  0  55
Ethnic Conflict Battle Deaths  UCDP  1,160 270.674 1,953.391  0  36,250
Nonethnic Conflict  UCDP  1,160 0.036 0.187  0  1
Nonethnic Conflict Duration  UCDP  1,160 0.610 3.739  0  41
Nonethnic Conflict Battle Deaths  UCDP  1,160 170.899 2,814.326  0  65,000
Inflation (CPI)  WDI  795 56.526 521.753  -4  11,750
Population (millions)  WDI  1,113 26.500 0.010  0  1,260
Total Emigrants (millions)  Defoort  1,160 1.831 12.800  0  177
Average Years of Education  Barro & Lee 668 5.194 2.917  0.140  12.250
Government Stability  ICRG  508 7.093 2.375  0  12
Investment Profile  ICRG  508 6.225 2.138  0  0
Corruption ICRG  508 3.282 1.391  0  6
Bureaucratic Quality  ICRG  508 2.136 1.229  0  4
Democratic Accountability  ICRG  558 3.228 1.836  0  6
Polity II  Polity IV  843 0.299 7.496  -10  10
Regime Durability  Polity IV  853 22.114 28.286  0  191
Legislative Electoral Competition  DPI  925 5.115 2.233  1  7
Executive Electoral Competition  DPI  925 4.923 2.197  1  7
Fractionalization DPI  753 0.451 0.320  0  1
Polarization DPI  851 0.340 0.720  0  2
Checks DPI  888 2.374 1.656  1  11
   17
 














Government Stability  0.174 0.074 0.659 -0.006 0.034  0.530
Investment Profile  0.344 0.268 0.663 0.005 -0.035  0.369
Corruption 0.278 0.731 -0.042 0.011 -0.029  0.386
Bureaucracy  0.403 0.711 0.199 0.015 0.035  0.291
Democratic Accountability  0.624 0.552 0.134 -0.024 -0.033  0.287
Polity Index  0.840 0.260 0.008 -0.053 -0.190  0.187
Regime Durability  0.108 0.560 0.085 -0.006 0.082  0.660
Legislative Index of Electoral Competition 0.869 -0.088 0.072 -0.123 0.102  0.207
Executive Index of Electoral Competition  0.860 0.014 0.021 -0.161 0.035  0.234
Electoral Fraud  -0.085 -0.372 -0.019 -0.112  0.246  0.781
Fractionalization  0.823 -0.012 0.065 0.205 0.033  0.276
Polarization  0.533 0.300 0.004 0.394 -0.025  0.470
Checks  0.710 0.196 -0.061 0.253 0.030  0.389
Highlighted cells represent factor loadings greater than 0.4.          
 
 Table 3: GMM Regression Results (Dependent Variable = High-Skilled Emigration)       
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Variables 


















**                        
   (0.0242)  (0.0301)                         
      0.0576
* 0.0795
** -0.0509 0.0054  0.0224 0.0793
** -0.0643 0.00478  Ethnic Conflict 
      (0.0307)  (0.0315)  (0.0673)  (0.0585) (0.0548) (0.0332) (0.0685) (0.0587) 
      0.0285  0.0389  0.0601  -0.00346  0.293
** 0.145
** 0.271
* 0.223  Nonethnic Conflict 
      (0.0431)  (0.0555)  (0.0824)  (0.164) (0.134)  (0.0711)  (0.15) (0.183) 
            0.00959
** 0.00356
*       0.00905
** 0.00357
* Ethnic Conflict 
Duration              (0.00462) (0.00208)        (0.00458) (0.00203) 
            -0.00283  0.00166        0.000854  -0.0029  Nonethnic Conflict 
Duration              (0.00694) (0.00618)        (0.00677) (0.00629) 
                  0.0243  1.22e-07  0.0132  3.96e-07  Ethnic Conflict 
Fatalities                    (0.0344)  (1.08e-05) (0.039)  (1.03e-05) 




** Nonethnic Conflict 
Fatalities                    (0.0824)  (4.28e-05) (0.0918)  (4.25e-05) 
GDP per Capita  2.23e-02  3.01e-02  2.37e-02  3.25e-02 3.33e-02 3.01e-02  2.06e-02 3.13e-02 3.04e-02 2.97e-05 
   (0.0337)  (0.0401)  (0.0328)  (0.0401)  (0.0393) (0.0389)  (0.0319) (0.0387) (0.0378) (0.0378) 
GDP per Capita
2 -6.58e-10 -9.95e-10 -7.17e-10 -1.10e-09 -1.09e-09 -9.58e-10  -5.64e-10 -1.03e-09 -9.52e-10 -9.28e-10 
   (0.00148)  (0.00176) (0.00144) (0.00176) (0.00172) (0.00173) (0.00141) (0.0017) (0.00166) (0.00168) 
CPI Inflation Rate  5.96e-06  6.71e-06  6.46e-06  7.45e-06 5.82e-06 7.50e-06  7.42e-06 7.69e-06 7.36e-06 7.88e-06 
   (9.30e-06)  (1.02e-05) (9.31e-06) (1.05e-05) (1.04e-05) (9.85e-06) (8.90e-06) (1.01e-05) (9.88e-06) (9.63e-06) 
Population 1.96e-04  2.47e-04  1.97e-04  2.55e-04 2.78e-04 2.47e-04 1.69e-04 2.54e-04 2.58e-04 2.48e-04 
   (1.44e-04)  (1.69e-04) (1.45e-04) (1.70e-04) (1.86e-04) (1.63e-04) (1.51e-04) (1.64e-04) (1.93e-04) (1.60e-04) 











   (0.00637)  (0.00779) (0.00618) (0.00773) (0.00745) (0.00738) (0.00614) (0.00745) (0.00736) (0.00717) 
                 1
Table 3 (continued): GMM Regression Results (Dependent Variable = High-Skilled Emigration)       
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Variables 
















Average Education  0.0309
* 0.0363 0.0314
* 0.0375
* 0.0322 0.0329 0.0297
* 0.0368
* 0.0313 0.0323 












   (0.0125)  (0.0136)  (0.0128)  (0.014)  (0.0143) (0.0133)  (0.0123) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0131) 
Transparency  -0.0201 -0.0184 -0.019 -0.0175  -0.0144 -0.0212 -0.0267 -0.0239 -0.0214 -0.0262 
   (0.0238)  (0.0265)  (0.0233)  (0.0269)  (0.0262) (0.0271)  (0.0244) (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0269) 
Credibility  -0.0292 -0.0322  -0.0299  -0.0339  -0.0417 -0.0264  -0.0286 -0.0343 -0.0409 -0.0283 
   (0.0368)  (0.0402)  (0.0367)  (0.0406)  (0.0441) (0.0416)  (0.0356) (0.0391) (0.0427) (0.0403) 
Constant  0.155 0.121  0.153  0.116  0.135 0.132  0.163 0.121 0.141 0.138 
   (0.110)  (0.134)  (0.109)  (0.136)  (0.130) (0.135) (0.105) (0.131) (0.123) (0.131) 
Observations  276 276  276  276  276 276  276 276 276 276 
R
2 0.378 0.264  0.362  0.217  0.240 0.306 0.414 0.263 0.310 0.333 
Adjusted R
2 0.335 0.213  0.315  0.159  0.177 0.249 0.366 0.202 0.247 0.272 
Uncentered R
2 0.922 0.908  0.920  0.902  0.905 0.913 0.927 0.908 0.914 0.916 
F  10.520  9.023  9.708  8.059  7.569 8.615 9.692 7.851 7.655 8.289 
Identification  Stat  9.582 9.582  9.582  9.582  9.582 9.582  9.582 9.299 9.582 9.299 
p  <  ID  Stat  0.002 0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1       
Excluded Instruments: Energy consumption per capita and energy consumption per capita squared for GDP per capita and GDP per capita 
squared.  
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GDP per Capita  0.030                                                    
Ethnic (PITF)  0.100  -0.241                                                 
Ethnic Duration  0.145  -0.200 0.821                                             
Nonethnic (PITF)  0.037  -0.120 -0.080 -0.066                                          
Nonethnic Duration  0.007  -0.102 -0.068 -0.056 0.846                                       
Ethnic (UCDP)  0.095  -0.207 0.803 0.714 0.015 -0.009                                    
Ethnic Duration  0.203  -0.142 0.628 0.752 0.001 -0.019 0.772                                  
Ethnic Deaths  0.046  -0.138 0.471 0.335 -0.026 -0.031 0.464  0.352                               
Nonethnic (UCDP)  0.039  -0.115 -0.076 -0.063 0.853 0.765 -0.079 -0.061 -0.037                            
Nonethnic Duration  0.051  -0.108 -0.073 -0.060 0.800 0.835 -0.076 -0.059 -0.035  0.959                         
Nonethnic Deaths  -0.055  -0.089 -0.059 -0.048 0.733 0.628 -0.061 -0.047 -0.028  0.773  0.675                      
Inflation  0.099  -0.070 -0.040 -0.034 0.144 0.090 -0.039 -0.029 -0.012  0.152  0.157  0.135                   
Population 0.149  -0.054  0.317 0.153 -0.031 -0.025 0.174  0.153  0.221  -0.024 -0.021 -0.030  -0.016               
Total Emigrants  -0.356  0.199  0.046 0.054 -0.047 -0.036 0.088  0.094  0.030  -0.034 -0.033 -0.021  -0.045 0.216            
Ave. Education  0.157  0.755 -0.267 -0.165 -0.118 -0.107 -0.274 -0.124 -0.160  -0.093 -0.083 -0.084  -0.038 -0.033 0.153         
Democracy -0.112  0.411 -0.098 -0.087 -0.001 0.009 -0.100 -0.071 0.004  0.028  0.030  0.052  0.007 -0.107 0.163 0.528      
Transparency 0.047  0.701 -0.186 -0.196 -0.084 -0.082 -0.161 -0.116 -0.144  -0.130 -0.108 -0.179  -0.119 0.064 0.158 0.622 0.159    
Credibility -0.008  0.176  -0.226 -0.106 -0.149 -0.110 -0.211 -0.145 -0.156 -0.149 -0.136 -0.171 -0.208 0.029 0.025 0.146 -0.076 0.131 
Highlighted cells represent correlation coefficients greater than 0.3   3
 











ability LIEC EIEC Frac. 
Pol-
ariz. 
Investment Profile  0.645                             
Corruption  0.070 0.289                          
Bureaucratic Quality  0.205 0.390 0.729                       
Democratic Accountability  0.122 0.314 0.656 0.645                    
Polity -0.014 0.186 0.458 0.449 0.674                 
Regime Durability  0.114 0.236 0.475 0.520 0.427 0.205              
Legislative Electoral Competition  -0.042 0.204 0.254 0.184 0.435 0.631 0.078           
Executive Electoral Competition  -0.070 0.158 0.304 0.274 0.499 0.788 0.110 0.710        
Political Fractionalization  0.134 0.140 0.236 0.246 0.403 0.483 -0.061 0.578 0.431     
Political Polarization  0.155 0.226 0.339 0.341 0.457 0.428 0.159 0.309 0.343 0.554  
Checks 0.084 0.229 0.343 0.406 0.507 0.564 0.192 0.435 0.547 0.522 0.608
Highlighted cells represent correlation coefficients greater than 0.3 